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ABSTRACT 
 
Using the newly expanded set of 40 social tables from pre-modern 
societies, the paper tries to find out the factors associated with the 
level of inequality and the inequality extraction ratio (how close to the 
maximum inequality have the elites pushed the actual inequality). We 
find strong evidence that elites in colonies were more extractive, and 
that more densely populated countries exhibited lower extraction 
ratios. We propose several possibilities linking high population 
density to low inequality and to low elite extraction.   
 
 
 
Key words: pre-modern, inequality, economic history   
JEL Classification: D3, N3, O1 
Number of words: about 7,300 
  
                                                          
1 Graduate Center City University of New York and the Stone Center for Socio-Economic Inequality.  
Email: bmilanovic@gc.cuny.edu.  
2 
 
 
1. Introduction: our very limited knowledge of pre-modern inequality 
The past decade has seen substantial increase in the number of estimates of inequality for 
pre-modern societies (defined broadly as societies before they experienced the Industrial revolution). 
Most of these estimates are based on social tables, some originally created by the contemporaries 
and reused and modified more recently and some created recently from the archival evidence. In 
2016, Lindert and Williamson (2016) published a book on US inequality with the first detailed social 
tables for the United States created for the years 1774, 1850, 1860 and 1870. Alvarez-Nogal and 
Prados de la Escosura have in several important publications (2004, 2007, 2013) charted the 
evolution of Spanish inequality over more than five centuries. Reis (2016) estimates inequality in 
Portugal over two centuries (between 1565 and 1770). Javier Rodriguez Weber’s (2015) recent work, 
using “dynamic social tables”,  has done a similar thing for Chile, covering the period from the 
country’s independence in 1820 to 1970. Bertola et al. (2008) and Prados de la Escosura (2007) have 
studied inequality in the Southern Cone countries around the turn of the 20th century. Marette (2013) 
and Lopez Jerez (2014) have produced recent papers (dissertations) on inequality in the colonial 
North and South Vietnam.  Josiah Ober’s (2015) book on Athens includes estimates of Athenian 
income inequality in the 4th century BC. 
Very detailed empirical work on wealth inequality in the cities and larger areas (but falling 
short of a “nation-state” or Empire) was done recently by Alfani (2010, 2014), Alfani and Amennati 
(2014), Ryckbosch (2014) and Alfani and Ryckbosch (2016). In several papers, they study the cities 
of Northern Italy and the Low Countries in the Middle Ages. Their work has focused on the effects 
of the plague and the role of the commercial revolution in Europe from the 14th to the 19th century. 
There are also studies of inequality in the cities of Western Europe (Amsterdam in the 18th century 
by McCants 2007), the Iberian peninsula (Reis, 2016 for several cities and urban areas in Portugal 
between the 16th and the 18th century; Nicolini and Ramos-Palencia, 2016 for the cities in the 
Spanish province of Palencia in the mid-18th century), Middle East (Bursa by Canbakal, 2012, 
Kastamonu, a city in Anatolia, by Coşgel and Ergene, 2011).  Ottoman surveys have also provided 
very valuable evidence for selected parts of the Empire (Coşgel, 2008; Coşgel and Ergene 2012).   
While all this accumulation of the new evidence is remarkable, the work on causal factors 
that might have driven inequality and explanations of the changes in historical inequality, have hardly 
begun. In 1995 van Zanden published an important paper (van Zanden, 1995) that argued for the 
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existence of a premodern Kuznets curve where inequality rose as mean income in Northern Europe 
went up. This could be viewed as the upward portion of a Kuznets curve.  Van Zanden and then 
Ryckbosch posit that the explanation for the rising inequality resides in what they call the “classical 
factors”, namely increased share of capital in national income. Since income from capital tends to be 
much more unequally distributed than income from labor, the change in factoral composition 
translates into an increase in inter-personal inequality.  
Epidemics, wars and natural catastrophes were proposed, especially by Alfani (2010, 2014) 
and Herlihy (1978), as possible explanations for the declines in inequality. Here the mechanism is 
seen to go through a reduction in population which shifts the proportion between produced capital 
and labor, making labor relatively scarcer and increasing the wage rates. This then  reduces inter-
personal inequality. Scheidel (2017) in his forthcoming book “The great leveler” has taken this line 
of reasoning even further maintaining that all substantial declines in inequality over the course of 
recorded history are due to major natural or political dislocations, that is to epidemics, wars, 
revolutions and state collapses. 
Pre-modern evolution of inequality can be, as argued by Milanovic (2016), placed in the 
same context as the evolution of inequality in the modern era. He claims that both can be explained 
as Kuznets wave-like movements, of waxing and waning inequality. The difference though is that in 
the pre-modern era the swings are driven by non-economic factors (epidemics and wars) while in the 
modern era economic and political factors became more important: technological change and 
transfer of labor from agriculture into manufacturing and nowadays from  manufacturing into 
services, the spread of education, political demand for social transfers, trade union density and the 
like.  
The objective of this paper is to push forward this line of research to pre-modern societies. 
We try to find out what are the regularities that exist between economic and demographic factors, 
and changes in inequality in the pre-modern era. It is important to note that while the agreement on 
the exact drivers of inequality in the contemporary period is not perfect, our knowledge of the 
changes in inequality in the latter part of the 20th century and in the first decade of the 21st is 
incomparably better than our knowledge of pre-modern inequality. And so is our reasoning about 
the factors that may influence inequality. When it comes to pre-modern inequality, we are very much 
at the beginning. 
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As far as the hypotheses of what might explain movements in pre-modern inequality our 
situation is now at about the same point as where the analysis of contemporary inequality was in the 
1970s or 1980s: we do have some data, but they are fragmentary and often not fully comparable, and 
we have at best some guesses about the forces that might explain changes in inequality. The situation 
may be arguably even worse because the number of “independent” variables that we have for pre-
modern societies is extremely limited, much more so than what in the 1970s or 1980s we had for the 
contemporary societies. With these severe limitations in mind, the present paper aims to collect  in 
one place the evidence that we have on historical inequality and to suggest a hypothesis regarding 
the forces that are responsible for it.  
 The next section discusses the data used in the paper. Section 3 gives descriptive statistics of 
pre-modern Ginis and presents empirical evidence of the relationship between inequality and 
“independent” variables that might influence it.  Section 4 concludes the paper by discussing 
possible next steps that should improve our understanding of pre-modern inequality. 
 
2. The data  
The data from which we estimate inequality in this paper come from social tables, and in a 
few instances from surveys of settlements (villages) or fiscal data. Social tables are the lists of salient 
socio-economic groups at a given pointy in time and in a given country, that can run for just a few 
groups to several hundreds. The prototype and the earliest example of a social table is Gregory 
King’s famous social table for England and Wales in 1688 which includes 31 groups running from 
beggars to high nobility.  Often, social tables have not been created by contemporary writers (such 
as Gregory King or William Colquhoun who created an almost equally famous social table for 1801 
England and Wales) but by more recent researchers using archival evidence. Such are the social 
tables for the United States for 1774, 1850, 1860 and 1870 recently created by Lindert and 
Williamson (2016). In this paper I use only social tables that pertain, at least in principle, to an entire 
“political unit” or a significant portion of an entire “political unit”, that is, to what we would call 
today a nation/county or Empire. This rules out social tables referring to individual cities. 2  
                                                          
2 As mentioned before, a number of such studies have been undertaken recently. They are extremely valuable for our 
understanding of inequality but in this context could lead to biased results where, for example, inequality in Paris is 
ascribed to the entire Kingdom of France. But the data on Tuscan (basically Florentine) income distribution obtained 
from the famous 1427 Catasto are acceptable because Tuscany was then a “political unit”.   
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Most of the social tables used here (more exactly 29 out of 40) have already been used by 
Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (in the further text MLW) (2011) and a detailed explanation of 
the procedure applied to the individual tables, their characteristics and sources  is provided in that 
paper and in Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2007). However since MLW had published their 
paper a significant number of new social tables for pre-modern societies have been created and in 
this paper I take advantage of them. There are 11 new social tables and information for each of 
them is provided in Annex 1 (the new data are also highlighted by asterisks in Table 1).  
Table 1 gives the summary of the main features of each social table. The data are arranged in 
chronological order, from the earliest one for Athens in 330 BCE to the 1938 social table for British 
India. As in the MLW paper, the cut-off point after which the label “pre-modern” no longer applies 
is, for the countries that were “early developers” (Western Europe and North America), mid-19th 
century, and for all the others, 1939, the outbreak of the Second World War. After that point, it 
could be argued, no pre-modern economies existed, not solely because many of them began to 
industrialize but also because they were part of what might vaguely be considered “modernity”, that 
is they were all part of the international political and economic system and used economic policy to 
explicitly try to speed up development. 
The average Gini of the countries included here is 44.1 with the standard deviation of almost 
10 Gini points. The Gini range is from less or equal to 25  (South Serbia in 1455, China in 1880 and 
Tonkin in 1929) to more than 60 (Nueva España and the Netherlands, both in the 18th century). It 
may be noted at the outset that this range as well as the average Gini are similar to what we find for 
modern economies. Thus, for example, using the most recent global data for 2011, the average 
national Gini in the world is 38 with the standard deviation of 10 Gini points. The Gini range is 
from 25 (Belarus, Slovenia, Denmark) to 66 (South Africa). 3 
Pre-modern GDPs per capita range from just barely above the subsistence (South Serbia in 
1455, Kenya in 1914, and Moghul India) to about $PPP 2,300 (US in 1870 and Chile in 1900). The 
latter amount is some 6 to 8 times the subsistence (depending on whether we assume the subsistence 
to be $PPP300 or $PPP400). Here, however, there are no similarities between pre-modern and 
present-day societies. The average (unweighted) country GDP per capita in 2011 was $PPP 13,000 
which is some six times greater than the highest pre-modern GDP per capita in our sample.    
                                                          
3 Calculated from LIS data.  
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Table 1. Key characteristics of countries included 
Country 
(political unit) 
Year to 
which social 
table refers 
Estimated 
inequality (in 
Gini points) 
Estimated 
GDP per capita 
(in 1990 PPP 
dollars) 
Estimated 
population 
(in 000s) 
Source of 
data 
Athens * 330 BCE 37.4 1333 240 Social table 
Roman Empire 14 39.4 633 55,000 Social table 
Byzantine 
Empire 
1000 41.1 533 15,000 Social table 
England 1290 36.7 639 4,300 Social table 
Tuscany 1427 46.1 978 38 Census  
South Serbia 1455 20.9 443 80 Census of 
settlements 
Holland 1561 56.0 1129 376 Fiscal data 
Cracow 
voivodship* 
1578 53.0 810 476 Social table 
Levant (Syria, 
Lebanon) 
1596 39.8 974 237 Survey of 
settlements 
England and 
Wales 
1688 45.0 1418 5700 Social table 
Holland  1732 61.1 2035 2035 Fiscal data 
Moghul India 1750 48.9 530 182,000 Social table 
Old Castile 
(Spain) 
1752 52.5 745 1980 Social table 
England and 
wales 
1759 45.9 1759 6463 Social table 
USA (13 
colonies)* 
1774 45.7 1182 2376 Social table 
France 1788 55.9 1135 27,970 Social table 
Nueva España 
(Mexico) 
1790 63.5 755 4,500 Social table 
England and 
Wales 
1801 51.5 2006 9,053 Social table 
Bihar (India) 1807 33.5 533 3,362 Social table 
Netherlands 1808 57 1800 2,100 Fiscal data 
Kingdom of 
Naples 
1811 28.4 637 5,000 Social table 
USA* 1850 48.7 1292 23,580 Social table 
USA* 1860 51.1 2178 31,839 Social table 
Chile* 1860 46.6 1282 2,074 Social table 
USA* 1870 51.4 2292 40,241 Social table 
Brazil 1872 43.3 721 10,167 Occupational 
census 
Peru  1876 42.2 653 2,469 Social table 
China 1880 24.5 540 377,500 Social table 
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Java 1880 39.7 661 20,020 Social table 
Maghreb 1880 57.1 694 5,002 Social table 
Japan 1886 39.5 916 38,622  
Chile* 1900 45.0 2232 2,527 Social table 
European 
Russia* 
1904 37.5 1237 106,230 Social table 
Kenya 1914 33.1 456 3,816 Social table 
Java  1924 32.1 988 35,170 Social table 
Kenya 1927 46.2 558 3,922 Social table 
Cochinchina 
(South 
Vietnam)* 
1929 36.8 1580 5,741 Social table 
Tonkin (North 
Vietnam)* 
1929 25.6 1122 9,036 Social table 
Siam 1929 48.5 793 11,607 Social table 
India 1938 49.7 617 346,000 Social table 
Mean --- 44.1 1060 --- --- 
Note: Countries marked with * are not included in MLW (2011) dataset; they are for the first time used in this 
paper and the sources are given in Annex 1. The data are ranked in chronological order. 
Gini is calculated from the social tables. GDP per capita is ether directly taken from the update of the 
Maddison files (Bolt and van Zanden 2013) or is calculated based on Maddison’s approach by the authors of the tables. 
See also Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2007).   
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3. Pre-modern inequality: description and hypothesis 
Pre-modern inequality in the context of the Inequality Possibility Frontier 
Figures 1 summarizes the key features of pre-modern inequality. Figure 1 plots estimated 
Ginis against GDP per capita (in PPP terms).  As can be readily seen, Ginis seem to increase with 
mean income.4  This is consistent both with what we would expect from the Kuznets hypothesis and 
with what is argued in Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2014), namely that higher levels of 
income give more “space” to inequality to increase. When mean income is extremely low (barely 
above the subsistence), inequality is perforce limited if we require that people are at least able to 
survive. Then the surplus that can be appropriated by the rich is small and inequality, measured by a 
synthetic indicator like a Gini coefficient, has to be low. (We have to assume that it is not in the 
interest of the rich to allow substantial decrease of the population due to famine. It is also not likely 
that they would be able to implement such a policy without a major uprising that might destroy their 
power.)    
Figures 2 and 3 extend this line of reasoning. Figure 2 does it by plotting the observed Ginis 
against the Inequality Possibility Frontier (IPF). 5 The IPF shows the maximum level of inequality 
obtainable at any given mean income under the assumption that all but an infinitesimal minority lived 
at the subsistence level. At the theoretical position of maximum inequality, the elite appropriates the 
entire surplus above the subsistence. The maximum “feasible” level of inequality increases as income 
goes up because with the greater surplus, there is simply more income for the elite to appropriate.  
The exact formula for the maximum Gini at a given level of income is 
𝛼−1
𝛼
 where α is the mean 
income expressed in the number of subsistence baskets (for more detail, see MLW, 2011, pp. 256-
259). Clearly, if α=1, there is no surplus and Gini is 0. For α>1, the maximum Gini becomes 
positive. In our sample, when the subsistence is assumed to be $PPP 300, α ranges between 1.5 and 
8, and the maximum Gini ranges between 0.33 and 0.87.  
After an income level of approximately $PPP 1,000, Ginis no longer remain as close to the 
Inequality Possibility Frontier (IPF) as for lower income values (Figure 2). In other words, IPF 
                                                          
4 The terms “mean income” and “GDP per capita” are used interchangeably.  
5 Data points for England/UK and the United States are highlighted.  
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expands faster than the observed Gini. The ratio between the observed Gini and the maximum Gini 
at a given level of income is called the Inequality Extraction Ratio.6   
Figure 3 plots the Inequality Extraction Ratios against mean income and highlights colonies 
(dark dots) for which we often find high extraction ratios. At very low levels of income, IER is 
around 100 percent, implying that inequality is pushed close (and in some cases even beyond) its 
maximum “feasible” level, that is beyond the level consistent with the maintenance of a society as a 
going concern. It is also notable that almost all poor countries (those with GDP per capita below 
$PPP 1000) that were colonies display very high inequality extraction ratios.   
With the increase in GDP per capita however, IER declines which, as we have seen, means 
that observed Ginis increase less than the maximum feasible Gini.  This regularity seems to hold 
throughout our sample with the exception of the richest countries where we find very high Ginis 
that make the IER go up again.  
 The relationship between on the one hand, Gini and the IER, and on the other hand, Gini 
and GDP per capita is worth exploring also for the three countries where we have at least three 
observations at different points in time. They are England/United Kingdom, the United States, and 
Holland/the Netherlands. For England/UK we expand our analysis to the Industrial era, up to 
1911.   
It is remarkable that for all three countries, increased GDP per capita went together with an 
increase in inequality. The evolution of inequality in England/UK is most interesting. The graph 
shows a steady rise of the Gini in the 19th century with a peak in the second half of that century. 
After that, there is a modest decline estimated for 1911.  The level of UK inequality in the latter part 
of the 19th century (which is strictly speaking beyond our limit of pre-modern era) was extremely 
high if we use the present-day standards. UK Gini was around today’s inequality level of Brazil and 
possibly even higher, given that the estimate we use here is based on social tables with information 
on income for some 20 to 30 groups (and with the assumption that the within-group inequality is 
zero)  while today’s estimates of inequality in Brazil are based on nation-wide household surveys that 
include several hundred thousand households. The former is thus (as discussed in Section 4) an 
underestimate of “true” inequality.   
                                                          
6 This is simply the distance between the dots in Figure 2 and the corresponding values of the maximum feasible Gini on 
the IPF, divided by the latter.  
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 At the same time in all three countries, IER  tended to go down with increased GDP per 
capita. An important exception however is England/UK where the period of the Industrial 
Revolution in the first half of the 19th century displays an uncharacteristically rising IER despite a 
substantial increase in mean income. It is of course driven by an even faster rising Gini. This is not 
unexpected though given what we know about the very unequal and wrenching process of British 
industrialization.7  
  
                                                          
7 The IER is also very high in England in 1290 but this is expected due to the very low mean income at the time. 
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Figure 1. Gini coefficient and level of GDP per capita in pre-modern societies 
 
Abbreviations: BRA=Brazil, BYZ=Byzantine Empire, CCN=Cochinchina, CHL=Chile, CHN=China, 
ESP=Spain (Old Castile), FRA=France, GBR=England/Wales or United Kingdom, IDN=Indonesia  (Java), 
IND=India, ITA=Tuscany, JPN=Japan, KEN=Kenya, LVN=Levant (parts of today’s Lebanon, Syria and Israel), 
MEX=Nueva España,  MGB=Maghreb, NLD=Holland or the Netherlands, PER=Peru, POL=Poland, ROM=Roman 
Empire, RUS=Russia, SRB=South Serbia, THA=Siam, TNK=Tonkin, USA=13 colonies (the United States).  
Gini shown in percentage terms (i.e., Gini of 0.3=30). Horizontal axis in logs. 
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Figure 2. Observed Gini coefficients against the Inequality Possibility Frontier in pre-
modern societies 
 
Note: For country abbreviations, see Note to Figure 1. Horizontal axis in logs. 
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Figure 3. Inequality extraction ratio  and level of GDP per capita in pre-modern societies 
 
Note: Inequality Extraction Ratio in percent. Colonies marked by full (dark) dots. Horizontal axis in logs. 
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Figure 4. Gini coefficient and GDP per capita over time in England/UK, United States and 
Holland/Netherlands 
 
Figure 5. Inequality extraction ratio and GDP per capita over time in England/UK, United 
States and Holland/Netherlands 
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Correlates of pre-modern inequality 
So far we have concluded that pre-modern inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient) 
tended to rise as mean income increased. We have also found some evidence that the observed Gini 
increase was not as fast as the increase in the maximum feasible Gini and thus that the Inequality 
Extraction Ratio was smaller in more advanced economies.  
The next step is to look at possible correlates of pre-modern inequality. The task there is 
both more complicated and simpler than when we do analogous exercises for contemporary 
economies. It is simper because the number of economic and social variables that are available for 
pre-modern economies and can be thought related to inequality is small. Unlike the situation for the 
contemporary economies where factors such as educational attainment, age composition of the 
population, trade union density, government spending as a share of GDP, trade as the percentage of 
GDP  etc. have been adduced, and tested, as possible explanans of inter-personal inequality, for the 
pre-modern times we have only very few such variables. Thus our choice is rendered relatively 
simple.  
But on the other hand, the dearth of information on possibly relevant  variables makes our 
conclusions much weaker. We may simply be not including some factors that are important but for 
which we lack numeric information. Such factors could be thought to be distribution of land 
holdings, fiscal pressure, the size of the armed forces, type of government (oligarchic, despotic, with 
a weak or strong fiscal capacity) and the like. Therefore, the conclusions that we make will be 
necessarily very provisional and may be subject to revision when additional and better socio-
economic data regarding the past become available. 
Our next step is to look at the correlates of both Gini and IER in our sample of 40 pre-
modern economies. The results are shown in Table 2 (columns 1 and 3).8 They are as follows. GDP 
per capita (in curvilinear formulation) is borderline significant (positive relationship up to a certain 
level) when it comes to inequality  but not at all when we consider the IER. It would thus appear 
that the changes in the IER may not be explained simply by countries becoming richer but by the 
changes in other  variables. This is indeed what we find for population density which is  strongly 
negatively associated with the extraction ratio. Also, being a colony is strongly positively associated  
with the extraction ratio. Urbanization, which is often argued to be a strong correlate of inequality in 
                                                          
8 We also control for specific features of the social tables. These control variables are explained in the notes to Table 2.  
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both pre-modern (see van Zanden 1995) and modern societies, is positively correlated with the IER, 
but is not statistically significant. Overall, it could be argued that (not surprisingly) colonies were 
more extractive and more populous countries were less extractive. The latter finding is probably the 
most interesting one and I will return to it. 
When we look at the correlates of inequality, the situation is similar although both the overall 
R2 and the significance of the coefficients are weaker than in the case of the Inequality Extraction 
Ratio. The only variable significant at less than 5% level is population density (negatively correlated 
with Gini coefficient). Urbanization is, as expected, borderline positively correlated. No other 
variable seems to matter. 
The preliminary conclusion is therefore that growth of income as such did not have a 
discernable effect either on inequality or the level of extraction of surplus.9 In pre-modern 
economies, it could be argued, change in GDP per capita does not act as a proxy for a structural 
transformation that we normally associate with it in modern societies (e.g. richer economies are now 
more service-oriented than the poor, and in the recent past they were more manufacturing-oriented 
than the poor). It is thus perhaps not surprising that the mean income does not play much of a role 
in explaining either inequality or IER changes. 10 
The second important conclusion is that colonies were not necessarily more unequal, but 
were more exploitative in the sense that inequality was pushed closer to the frontier than in non-
colonized societies. The fact of being a colony raises the inequality extraction ratio by almost 13 
points which is about ½ of the standard deviations of IER in our sample.   
Another important conclusion concerns the role of population density: it reduces both 
measured inequality and the extraction ratio. Thus, high number of people per square kilometer 
seems to be a strong predictor of relatively egalitarian economic outcomes.  
Why could it be the case?  We cannot establish the reason with the data we have but we can 
make conjunctures. There may be two possibilities. Less extractive economies would imply, 
everything else the same, that the poor would have a higher income than in more extractive 
economies. This relative comfort of the poor might in a Malthusian fashion lead to a greater increase 
in population. (Note that in the extreme case when the IER is 100%, population is likely merely to 
                                                          
9 This is when we control for other variables. In two-way displays such as in Figures 1 and 3, GDP does play a role. 
10 This point is similar to the one made in Milanovic (2016, Chapter 2) that pre-industrial inequalities are not driven by 
economic factors. 
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reproduce itself.) Thus, over time, we may notice the association between less extractive regimes and 
higher population density but the true causality would go from having a more lenient (egalitarian) 
regime to higher population growth. 
The other possibility implies an exactly opposite causal mechanism. Population density may 
turn out to be high for an entirely different reason wholly independent of the level of extraction, but 
once in existence this relatively high number of people per unit of land may make the ruler’s 
position more precarious and subject to an implicit popular veto, especially in pre-modern 
economies where the military force of the ruler, compared to that of people, is not overwhelming. 
Then the policy of the ruler or of the elite may be “milder” and less extractive principally because of 
fear of being overthrown (see Do and Campante, 2009).  The causality here runs from high 
population to low extraction ratio.  In real life, it is of course, likely that both mechanisms played a 
role.   
Finally, there is another line of argument that I think however we should reject. It is 
noticeable that the countries with the highest population density are from Asia. In effect, all top four 
countries by population density are Asian: Java (Indonesia), Japan, India and Cochinchina. The 
might lead us to add in the regressions an Asia dummy. Columns (2) and (4) in Table 2 show the 
results. The interesting result is that for the Gini, population density now becomes insignificant 
whereas GDP per capita turns significant, exhibiting the usual Kuznets like inverted U shape. For 
IER, population density also ceases to matter and the only statistically significant variable that 
remains is colonial status.  
The question is whether it is reasonable to add the Asia dummy. I think that the arguments 
against it are strong. Asian countries that we have in the sample (China, India, Indonesia, the two 
Vietnams, Japan and the Levant) do not share anything in common that could be considered as 
“Asian”, other than the fact that they belong to a continent whose borders are to a large degree 
arbitrary. In other words, it is hard to see what factor could be put under the heading of “Asianess” 
for the countries as different among themselves and over time, as the Levant in the 16th century and 
Thailand (Siam) in 1929. There is nothing obvious in terms of economics, religion, social or political 
organization that could be considered common. It is for this reason that I  believe that the 
introduction of an Asia dummy even if econometrically sensible since that variable seems to matter 
(although not that much by itself as it is not statistically significant) should be rejected. This in turn 
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leads us to keep the conclusions about the role of population density and colonial status in 
explaining the level of pre-modern inequality, and more importantly, the Inequality Extraction Ratio. 
 
Table 2. Explaining Gini and Inequality Extraction Ratio 
 Gini Inequality extraction ratio 
 1 2 3 4 
GDP per capita in 
PPP dollars 
164.9 
(0.10) 
179.2 
(0.07) 
-63.9 
(0.68) 
-40.2 
(0.79) 
GDP per capita 
squared 
-11.6 
(0.11) 
-12.8 
(0.08) 
2.7 
(0.81) 
1.0 
(0.93) 
Urbanization rate 
(% of population) 
0.35 
(0.06) 
0.32 
(0.09) 
0.55 
(0.06) 
0.51 
(0.08) 
Population density 
(people per km2) 
-0.07* 
(0.03) 
-0.05 
(0.12) 
-0.12* 
(0.02) 
-0.10 
(0.08) 
Asia dummy  -5.2 
(0.20) 
 -8.7 
(0.18) 
Colony (dummy 
variable) 
5.6 
(0.15) 
7.5 
(0.07) 
13.6* 
(0.03) 
16.70** 
(0.01) 
Survey controls a/     
No foreign rulers 
included (dummy) 
-13.5 
(0.06) 
-13.2 
(0.06) 
-27.8* 
(0.01) 
-27.2* 
(0.01) 
Tax-data (dummy) -1.2 
(0.82) 
-0.6 
(0.91) 
-4.3 
(0.60) 
-3.3 
(0.68) 
Number of social 
groups 
-0.0002 
(0.81) 
-0.0002 
(0.78) 
-0.0004 
(0.77) 
-0.0005 
(0.68) 
Constant -543.6 
 (0.11) 
-592.4 
(0.09) 
311.6 
(0.57) 
209.2 
(0.74) 
R2 adjusted 0.28 0.30 0.58 0.61 
F value 2.9 2.8 5.4 5.1 
Number of 
observations 
40 40 40 40 
Note: p-values shown between brackets. One (two) asterisks denote coefficients statistically significantly 
different from zero at 5(10) percent level.  
a/ These are variables that control for the differences in the survey (social tables) set ups. “No foreign rulers 
included” is a dummy variable (=1) if a country is a colony but foreign colonial population is not included in the survey; 
“tax data” is a dummy variable (=1) if the source is not a social table but tax data; “number of social groups” gives the 
number of social groups included in a social table.  
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4. Conclusions and further directions 
Despite an impressive recent progress in the availability of historical data on income 
distribution our knowledge of past inequality is woefully inadequate. Continuous historical data for a 
hundred or so years (from the turn of the 20th century to today) exist for barely a dozen countries. 
Even for those countries, the earlier data are available only sporadically. The situation with other 
countries is much worse. The extraordinary advances like estimates of wealth or income inequality in 
mediaeval Northern Italy or the Low Countries have to be set against the fact that these data exist 
for only a few years and a few localities, and that between such mediaeval data and our estimates of 
Roman income distribution, there is a yawning gap of more than a millennium—with almost no 
information at all. 
There are also problems with social tables. The number of included social groups can at 
times be very small. Even when the number is adequate and we trust that the creator of the table has 
indeed included all salient groups and made correct estimates of their incomes, the assumption that 
we have to use is that inequality within each group is zero. In other words, the overall inequality as 
calculated from the social tables is a between-group inequality only.  Some attempts to allow for 
within-group inequality have been made by Modalsli (2015) but the problem there is the arbitrary 
nature of such within-group inequality adjustments. We can perhaps argue that merchants might 
have been distributed along the entire income distribution, ranging from those very rich to those 
very poor (even if we do not know how that particular distribution looked). For the top classes, like 
senators in Rome, or for the bottom classes (slaves or peasants), we do know that their distributions 
were extremely narrow—that is, no peasant was likely to be among the rich, and no senator was by 
definition poor (since there was a wealth census requirement).  But for other classes, we have no 
prior evidence or information about their distributions and moreover putting a number on such 
distribution (how equal or unequal) is impossible. Thus the between-group-only approach still seems 
to be the best, not the least because it dispenses with the arbitrary widening of within-group 
distributions and forces us to be conservative in our estimates of overall inequality.11 
Dynamic social tables introduced by Rodríguez Weber (2014) represent an important 
innovation. If the information for the benchmark years is well chosen and reasonably plentiful (as 
indeed it is for Chile), then keeping the social class structure unchanged and allowing income of each 
                                                          
11 If we allow for very wide within-group distributions, we can produce almost any overall Gini.  
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class to rise or fall in accordance with other available macro data (e.g., occupational wages) provides 
annual social tables. The same class structure is maintained until a new benchmark year when 
information on the (slightly different) class structure becomes available. Hopefully, this approach 
could  be replicated in other countries. 
Historic data are not, compared to the current standards,  poor only on the side of the 
variables to be explained (Gini or another indicator of inequality). They are also, as mentioned 
before, poor for the explanatory variables. It is unlikely that some of these omissions will ever be 
remedied: data on government spending for some ages or countries will probably never be retrieved, 
and in many places might not have existed to start with. However, political data could be produced 
from the information that we have about those societies. Similarly to the modern political databases 
that score democracy and autocracy in different societies it is not difficult to imagine  applying a 
somewhat similar approach to historical societies. We have a pretty good knowledge about the way 
the political system functioned in Athens, or Rome, 11th century Byzantium or 17th century 
Netherlands. Another important advance would be a more accurate and consistent codification of 
slavery. Many of the societies we include here have had slaves. But there is an obvious difference 
between an open slavery of the Roman type (what Paul Veyne, 2001 calls a “vertical slavery”) where 
slaves may be distributed along the entire income distribution and where manumission is frequent 
and a closed or “horizontal” slavery, as in the ante-bellum United States where being a slave implied 
not only the lowest social status but also the lowest income.  
Advances in numerical information or coding of pre-modern political regimes seem to me 
especially important because political factors  (including wars and civil strife) are likely to have 
played a disproportionate influence over inequalities in the past. The fact that the only political 
variable that we have in this dataset, colony, plays an important role, both in explaining the level of 
inequality and the extent to which the elite was able to push inequality close to its maximum, calls 
for greater attention to political variables. 
Our conclusion is twofold. First, the past range of observed inequalities is not very different 
from what exists today; but the inequality extraction ratios tended to go down with development, 
that is inequality did not rise as much as it theoretically could (with the possible exception of 
England during the Industrial Revolution). Second, being a colony and having high density of 
population are shown to be associated with respectively high and low inequality extraction ratio. The 
role of colonies is hardly unexpected. Population density presents a much more intriguing 
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proposition and further work should help to reinforce the hypothesis or reject it.  If the former, we 
should to try to tease out whether the causality went from high population density to low extraction 
rates or from low extraction rates to high population density. Choosing one or the other has obvious 
implications for the Malthusian view of pre-modern societies. 
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ANNEX 1. Sources and description of new social tables 
This Annex gives the essential information on new social tables used in this paper (the ones 
denoted by asterisks in Table 1). Other social tables were already used in Milanovic, Lindert and 
Williamson (2011) and their detailed description is provided there while full listing of social classes 
in each table and other information is given in Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2007, Appendix 
1). The tables are also available on the Global Price and Income History Group website 
http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/. 
Athens 330 BC. All data come from a social table (34 classes) created by Josiah Ober and 
personally communicated to me. Ober’ analysis is based on his book Rise and Fall of Classical Athens, 
Princeton University Press, 2016, and a similar assessment of inequality and social composition for 
the “core Hellas” (that is, an area larger than Athens but not coterminous with the Athenian empire) 
is presented there on pages 89-100. 
Cracow voivodship 1578. The social table is created in a paper by Mikolaj Malinowski and 
Jan Luiten van Zanden "National income and its distribution in pre-industrial Poland in a global 
perspective", European Historical Economics Society Working paper No. 76, May 2015, p.17. It  
includes 13 social groups from beggars to the King and his retinue.  
United States 1774, 1850, 1860, 1870. The first detailed social tables for the 13 colonies and 
then for the United States were created recently by Peter Lindert and Jeffrey Williamson. The tables 
provide the basis for their book Unequal Gains: American growth and inequality since 1700, Princeton 
University Press, 2016, and are discussed on Appendices A to G (pp. 262-348). The tables, with  
their many assumptions, were kindly provided by Peter Lindert. The tables consist of 74 social 
classes in 1774 and six income classes (the top 1%, top 5%, top 10%, top 20%, next 40% and 
bottom 40%) with their income shares and mean incomes for 1850, 1860 and 1870.  These last three 
tables therefore display cumulative income distributions.  Lindert and Williamson also give similar 
distributions for ten geographical areas of the United States. Slaves are included throughout 
although Lindert and Williamson also show the distributions for free households only. 
Chile 1860 and 1900. The data come from Javier Rodriguez Weber doctoral dissertation 
(Rodriguez Weber 2014). The data pertain to the benchmark social tables created for respectively 
1860-73 and 1900-05 with 49 social groups each and then converted (compressed) by Rodriguez 
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Weber into ten deciles of income distribution with their income levels and shares. The tables were 
kindly provided by Javier Rodriguez Weber.  
European Russia 1904. The table is created in a paper by Peter Lindert and Steven Nafziger, 
“Russian inequality on the eve of the revolution”, March 13, 2011, mimeo, available at 
http://web.williams.edu/Economics/wp/Nafziger_Lindert_Inequality_Sept2013.pdf. The version 
used here is the one kindly supplied by Peter Lindert and termed by Lindert as “the preferred 
version”. It consists of 19 social groups and is in part based on the Russian population census of 
1897.  
Tonkin and Cochinchina 1929. The social tables come from Merette (2013). Chapter III (p.9 
ff) estimates the social tables for the two parts of Vietnam. There are nine social groups for Tonkin 
and eight for Cochinchina. Foreign colonizers are included. 
 
 
